Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe
Volume 1

Issue 2

Article 1

4-1981

The Church and Contemporary Social Dynamics in Poland
James E. Will
Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree
Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Eastern European Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Will, James E. (1981) "The Church and Contemporary Social Dynamics in Poland," Occasional Papers on
Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol1/iss2/1

This Article, Exploration, or Report is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.

The Church and Contemporary Social Dynamics in Poland
by James E. Will
Professor Will, the chairperson of CAREE,
has visited Eastern Europe on numerous
occasions and has written frequently on
issues relating to the work of Christian
churches in Eastern Europe. He is the
Director of the Peace and Justice Center
and Professor of Systematic Theology at
Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The author has had the privilege of visiting Poland five times in the last
decade. Four were relatively brief visits in August 1971, September 1978,
September 1979 and May 1980. The most recent and lengthiest opportunity to
become directly acquainted with contemporary realities in Poland was from
September 2 3 to December 7, 1980 when Professor Will led a group of theological
students who studied at the Christian Academy of Theology, Warsaw, the Academy
of Catholic Theology, Warsaw, and the Catholic University of Lublin, with brief
visits also to Gdansk, Katowice, and Krakow. This period coincided with the
very important social developments precipitated by the strikes which began in
Gdansk and spread throughout the country during August 1980.
ESSENTIAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Contemporary Poland cannot be understood without clearly comprehending how
intimately the Christian Church has been involved with th� origin and develop
ment of the Polish nation. Some East Slavonic tribes were united into the
beginning of the Polish nation-stqte in 960 under the Piast Prince, who was
converted to Christianity in 966. In 1024 the Pope agreed both to the Piast
Prince being crowned King of Poland and to the national independence of the
Polish Church by removing them from the jurisdiction of the German Metropolitan
of Magdeburg and creating a new Polish Metropolitan of Gniezno. Thus Christi
anity was profoundly implicated in the formation of the Polish nation.
We cannot retrace within the limits of this paper the millenial-long
history of this church-state relationship. But we must at least note the
intimate bond which grew between Polish nationalism and the Roman Catholic
Church because of the centuries of political struggle between Poland and a
Lutheran Prussia on its western border and an Orthodox Russia on its eastern
border. The fact that Poland had a constitutional monarchy after 1505 and
an elected King after 1672 also put them at some political disadvantage between
their two absolutist neighbors. Of the 11 million citizens of Poland at the
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beginning of the 18th century, the Czar of Russia claimed to be the "protector"
of the 5 million who were Orthodox and the King of Prussia made the same claim
regarding the 200,000 who were Protestants, thereby justifying continuous
interference in the politics of Poland. After an alliance between Prussia,
Russia and a politically expansionist Austria in the 18th century, these
political-religious struggles led to the partitioning of Poland between these
three powers in 1773, 1793 and 1795. Poland lost her independence for 123
yearso During this period without a Polish state, the bond between the Polish
nation and the Roman Catholic Church was so strengthened that many Polish
patriots crone to accept the motto first expressed by the Bishop of Parmia
during the counter-reformation--"to be truly Polish is to be Roman Catholic. "
This contentious slogan was based on the reality that during the period of
partition it was largely the Roman Catholic Church which carried and protected
the Polish national identity.
The Versailles Treaty of 1919 restored independence to Poland for twenty
years, until the treaty of Von Ribbentrop and Molotov followed by the German
invasion of 1939 led to a new partition in which the Soviet Union took all of
the territory east of the Bug River and Nazi Germany occupied all the resto
During the terrible period of 1939-45, six million Poles were exterm inated.
After Germany was defeated in 1945, Poland regained independent statehood, as
a part of the bloc of East European nations led by the Soviet Union, with a
socialist state led by the Connnunist P arty. The Soviet Union kept the terri
tories east of the Bug River, but Poland was compensated by being given
western territories formerly under German control, from which most German
P rotestants fled to the West. The consequence was and is an almost religiously
homogeneous nation, with more than 90% of the population now being Roman
Catholic. Thus the historic bond between the Polish nation and the Roman
I

Catholic Church was strengthened by the consequences of World War II.
One cannot understand the role of the church in contemporary Poland with
out comprehending their history, which explains the nationalism of the Roman
Catholic Church in Poland and the Catholicism of the Polish nation, even after
connnunist rule during one generation of Polish history.
INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH OF THE CHURCH
Prof. Witold Zdaniewicz, SA� teaches Sociology of Religion at the Academy
of Catholic Theology, Warsaw, and directs the Sociological Research Institute
of Religion which gathers and publishes statistics of the Catholic Church in
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ORTHODOX AND PROTESTANT CHURCHES
The Orthodox Church was once strongly present in Poland due to the union
of Poland and Lithuania, which had ten Orthodox dioceses under the Patriarchate
of Constantinople. The Orthodox Church of Poland became autocephalous in 1924.
The Reformation especially in the form of Calvinism had an early and strong
influence on the Polish nobility. There was even a brief period in the late
16th century when P rotestants constituted a majority of the Polish parliament,
which was composed exclusively of representatives of the nobles. But P rotestantism
declined to a very small minority in contemporary Poland because it never
reached into the peasant class and became too identified with the national
interests of Germany and Sweden during some historical periods.
Today there are 450, 000 members of the Orthodox Church in Poland, 100, 000
Protestants, and approximately 50, 000 Old Catholicso These thirty minority
churches all live in great dispersion within the decisively Catholic majorityo
The largest eight of these thirty are united in the Polish Ecumenical Council:
the Orthodox, Polish Catholic, Old Catholic Mariavite, Lutheran, Reformed,
Methodist, Baptist and United Evangelical. Prof. Witold Benedyktowicz,
Superintendent of the Polish Methodist Church_, has been President of the
Council since 1977.

Dr. Zdzislaw Pawlik, Baptist, is its General Secretary.

CHRISTIAN EDUCATION
In the constitution of Poland of 1919-1939 the study of religion was
compulsory in the public schools. The OJnnnunist-led government carried
through a separation of church and state after 1948 which required the separa
tion of religious instruction from public education. Though at first strongly
resisted, the churches have discovered that the relocation of Christian educa
tion in parish centers has greatly strengthened the church. About 15, 000
persons now work as catechist� in the Catholic parishes. From 30-40% of
the average parish priest's time is now spent in catechization of children
and youth, assisted by women religious and lay people o
Over 90% of the children of Poland who have not yet received their first
Holy Communion attend such instruction. In the higher grades of elementary
school the percentage drops to 50%, and in secondary schools it is 30%. In
parishes especially related to universities, special catechization for
students is provided, consisting of lectures and discussion on Catholic
philosophy and theology, preparation for marriage, personal ethics and social
problems. Poetry readings, dramatic presentations often presented voluntarily
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Poland. He reports that Poland is now 93% Catholic by baptism, 3% are members
of other churches, and 4% are non-believers. The Catholic Church is now
organized in 17 dioceses with 79 Bishops and 7,556 parishes with over 10,000
church buildings and 1,600' chapels served by 15,444 priestso In addition
there are 42 monastic institutes for men with 4,207 religious priests, 1,477
brothers and 1,399 seminarians in 1978. There are 25,313 women religious,
8 2 3 novices and 450 postulants in 2,449 houses in Poland.
This impressive institutional strength continues to grow. The number
·
admitted to diocesan seminaries from 1973-78 increased about 48%, and the
increase from 1978-79

accelerated because of the effect of the election of

Cardinal Wojty!a as Pope and his papal visit to Poland. In 1979 there were
1,082 more students in diocesan seminaries than in 1971, and 675 more in
monastic seminaries, for a total of 5,845 candidates for the pristhood in
24 diocesan and 22 monastic seminaries. About 60% of the student candidates
go all the way to ordination. The only part of the Catholic Church in Poland
not realizing such growth is the religious orders for womeno From 1960-65
there was a precipitous decline of 50% in the number of novices entering
women's orders. The number then held fairly steady for the next decade1
1965-75, and has shown a slight growth since.
The most difficult aspect of institutional church growth in this socialist
society is in the construction of new church buildings, which requires
authorization· by the state. There was strong state cooperation in many cases
as 871 churches destroyed during World War II were reconstructed following
the war. But for 25 years it was every difficult to build new churches, so
that only 35 2 were constructed for 1945-70. Restrictions were eased after
1970, however, so that 186 new churches have been constructed during the
last decade plus 15 3 new or enlarged chapels and 51 new buildings for catechiza,

tion. Still, the Catholic Church is hampered in its pastoral care because of
difficulty in creating new parishes. In 1979 the average parish had 4,500 people,
but the largest had over 40,000, primarily because of governmental opposition to
the creation of new parishes and construction of new church buildings. There are
about 500 parish centers which function as parishes, though not yet registered
as such by the government. In 300 parishes people must travel over 12 kilometers
to reach their parish church.
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by professional actors, and social activities are also frequent. About 10%
of all the students in Poland are involved in such student groups. All in
all, it is perhaps one of the most successful national programs of Christian
education to be found in Europe, at least as measured by the degree of
voluntary participation, but also perhaps when measured by basic attitudes
toward the Christian faith in the Polish population as a whole. In 1968 a
public opinion poll indicated that 86.6% of the population thought of them
selves as deeply involved believers.

Ten years later in 1978 a similar poll

showed the percentage to be almost the same at 86.4%. The small remainder
categorize themselves as religiously indifferent or non-believers.
This does not mean that young people in contemporary Poland find it easy
to integrate the Christian tradition mediated to them by the church and the
contemporary ideology they are confronted with in the public schools and mass
media. This may be seen in that a surprisingfy large number of young people,
especially between the ages of 15 and 20, go through a crisis of faith often
resulting in deep, personal religious corrnnitment. Research at the University
of Warsaw reveals that 25% of the students active in the churches' student
work come from families where neither parent practiced the Christian faith.
Further research showed that 10% of the students in the University of Warsaw
accepted 100% of the theological and moral teaching of the Catholic Church,
another 10% accepted none of it, while 80% were selective or unsure.
More widespread research in religiosity in the whole of Poland during the
last twenty years indicates clear trends in two similar directions. About
10% of the people are deepening their religious life within the model of
traditional religiosity mediated by the church, especially in a movement
called "Oases" and through groups of "neocatechumenates." But the larger
trend is toward "selective religiosity." More than 30% of the population
declare themselves as believing Catholics who practice more or less frequently
but who neither adhere unconditionally to the doctrine nor fully submit to the
guidance of the church. This tendency toward selective religiosity is especially
cormnon among young people, persons with higher education and persons doing
highly specialized work.
Research on sexual morality carried out in 1978 amongst 2,500 persons in a
parish in southern Poland revealed that: 81% agreed with the church's position
against adultery, 68% accepted the teaching on divorce, 63% accepted the
teaching against sexual relations before marriage, and 60% agreed to the
traditional teaching on the use of contraceptives.
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CHRISTL�N HIGHER EDUCATION
The theological faculties of the Jagiellonean University in Krakow (founded
1364) and the University of Warsaw (founded 1816) were removed from the
universities by act of the government in 1954. At that time the Christian
Academy of Theology was founded by the same act as the continuation of the
Evangelical Faculty of Theology of the University of Warsaw. This faculty is
authorized to give Master, Doctorate and Habilitation Doctorate theological
degrees. It is organized in three sections, with five faculty chairs in the
Protestant section and five in the Orthodox plus one in the Old Catholic.
There are now 126 students full-time in the five year course. Students study
ing part-time while serving parishes bring the total to about 150 students.
This academy is perhaps the most ecumenical in Europe. Ten widely variant
Confessions, from Orthodox to

non-Trinitarian, are represented in it. At the

inauguration for the Academic Year 1980-81 f�r example, the liturgy was led
by an Orthodox Professor and the homily preached by a Seventh Day Adventist
Dozent. Some subjects are taught in connnon: languages, philosophy and the
universal history of the church; others are taught separately according to
the various traditions.
Being detached from the university has meant increased opportunity. They
now have their own rector and faculty senate and control their own budget. One
of the things this means is that they now publish much more than earlier
because the budget is available. Most Protestant theology before World War II
was taught in German using German literature. Since 1945 there has been a
strong motive to produce their own' Polish theological literature, and in a way
that does not simply reproduce the German. The budget is entirely underwritten
by the state, as it is for the Academy of Catholic Theology.
The Academy of Catholic Theology is, of course, a much larger institution.
I

Its total teaching staff now numbers more than 200, of which 116 have full
rights. Some of the lecturers from the outside who teach at this academy come
even from the Polish Academy of Science, perhaps the most prestigious research
and teaching faculty in Poland. The total full-time student body in all
programs numbers about 1,600, made up of priests, women religious and lay persons.
The faculty is creative in its critical reflection on the Catholic tradi
tion. The present Dean of the faculty, Prof. Juos, whose doctoral study was
supervised by Prof. Karol Wojtyla of the University of Lublin, criticizes the
traditional mode of moral theology. He thinks a method which first grounds
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itself positivistically in the exegesis of Scripture and/or the teaching of .the
magisterium, and then rationalizes its position by use of Aristotelian philosophy
leads either to authoritarian deontological or rationalized eudaemonistic ethics.
He understands ethics rather to be autonomous in that no "ought" may be logically
derived from any "is.. " Thus the basis for moral judgments must be in "axiological
experience, " not in either empirical science or propositional revelation. Loving
experience of the dignity of persons is the source of moral obligation. The
dogmas of theology become relevant to ethics at the point of understanding the
persons loved for their own sake. The theology of morality may not be dogmatic
theology applied, but morality enlightened by dogma. In this way, he follows
his famous mentor in trying to relate theology to the autonomous ethics of the
Polish philosophical tradition, and to illumine the relation between Christian
ethics and human rights, understood as generalizations of the experience of
human dignity.
Similar illustrations could be given of creativity in other areas. My
limited experience of this faculty allows me to point especially to Prof.
Gogacz whose work in the history of theology and philosophy point toward a
reinterpretation of Thomism as a theology of meeting

which intends to correct

the excessive neo-Platonism in Buber's theory of I-Thou relations; Prof.
Skovronek in ecumenical theology who in the spirit of John Paul II's encyclical,
Redemptor Hominis, stresses the omnipresence of Christ for the salvation of
all humanity, interpreting the church as "where Jesus Christ is"; Prof. Pashierb,
historian of art and published poet, who sees the Polish people as looking to
the church for an understanding o.f the "amplitude of human destiny" in a flat,
manipulated, technological culture; and Prof. Swiecicki, sociologist of
religion, who is preparing a new generation for its mission of relating
the Catholic tradition to the new urban, industrial and technological social
and economic structures.
CHURCH PRESS AND ACCESS TO PUBLIC MEDIA
Much has been made in the western press of the fact that one of the points
of agreement negotiated between the new union "Solidarnosc" and the Polish
government on August 31, 1980, guarantees the broadcast of the mass on Sunday
morning over Polish radio. This, of course, is significant because the church
has had no access to the public media since a Connnunist government came to
power. But its significance must be evaluated in the light of an oft-told
story in Poland about previous negotiations over the same matter between the
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church and government officials. As the story goes, the government offered to
provide the church access to radio and TV if they would reciprocate by allowing
the Communist Party access to the church's pulpits. The point is that these
pulpits in 1980 with their direct access to three-quarters of the population
including the working class remain the most effective mass media in Poland.
The Roman Catholic Church in Poland has had its own press, though the
restricted circulation is too small to satisfy all the church's needs. There
is no Catholic daily newspaper as such, but there are three Catholic weeklies
with a combined circulation of almost 200,000 copies, as well as monthlies,
bi-monthlies, quarterlies and annuals. There is also a significant press
published by Catholics grouped in PAX and ecumenical Christians grouped in
the Christian Social Association. Especially significant is the daily
newspaper published by PAX, "S!'owo Powszechne," with a daily circulation of
95,00 � increased to 200,000 on Sunday. Thou�h not directly a publication of
the church, it is highly valued by the church. Thus the church has long had
limited but significant access to the public through its own press.
THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION
The comparative youth of the present Polish population is not yet well
understood in the west. 70% of the population is under 35 years of age. The
average age of the workers in the Gdansk Lenin Ship Yards, the center of the
strike which led to the independent unions, is only 25 years. The Polish
work force is probably the youngest in Europe. The new leader of the
independent union Solidarnosc, Lech Wa�ensa, is just 38 years old. This age
•

structure helps explain the demand for more rapid social change, often found
in more youthful populations. The improved education of the working class
provided by this socialist state is also relevant here. It is young, relatively
well-educated workers who are pow demanding participation in the decision-making
processes which affect their lives.
The precarious economic situation in Poland is widely reported amongst
us in the W est. But the dynamics which created it are not always fairly
interpreted. During the decade of the 70's, the regime of Edward Gierek
sought a very rapid industrial expansion. They were under the necessity of
creating millions of new jobs for those born in the post-World War II
population boom, if the socialist promise of full employment was to be kept.
They also had to try to satisfy the growing demand in the Polish population
for more of the consumer goods which an industrialized society was supposed to
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provide. The result was an attempt at a rate of expansion beyond their
technical capacities, largely on the basis of borrowed foreign capital. The
first half of the decade from 1970-75 went fairly well. But inflation of
energy costs and recession in the West in the latter half of the decade
meant they could not repay on borrowed capital by selling goods in the West
as they had planned. The result is a foreign debt of more than $20 billion
and a 50% deficit in international tradeo Some factories begun 8 or 10
years ago are not yet in production. A much larger proportion of some other
production must then be designated for export.

Cutbacks on essential imports

such as medicines were instituted. For the first time in decades, a Poland
accustomed to eating well faced shortages of certain foods--butter, sugar,
meat, even potatoes.
These severe economic difficulties caused great dissatisfaction with the
leadership of their government and the C ommunist Party--a phenomenon entirely
similar to what Jimmy Carter and the Democratic Party faced in the USA at the
same time. In the latter half of the 70's, the Gierek government seemed to
lose its capacity for realistic ad justment to the growing economic crisis.
This fault was compounded by the ever larger incomes and privileges of many
of the leaders, drawn from the vast flow of expansion capital entering the
economy. While the wages of teachers, dentists and even medical doctors
stayed in the range of 3-5,000 z!s. per month, it is reported that some top
governmental officials awarded themselves 100,000 z!so per month, plus in some
cases almost unlimited expense accountso Control over so large a flow of new
investment led even to some instances of outright corruption. The indictments
of some former officials are now before the Polish courtso The truth that
power tends to corrupt, and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely, has
been recognized again. Thus the emergence of the independent unions as a
I

new means of democratic public control is fully understandable. It has been
matched in part by a more openly expressed, critical spirit in the whole
society, reflected in the P arliament, the journalists, the universities and
the church.
THE CHURCHES' ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL CHANGE IN POLAND
Given the religious profile of Poland, it is only the Roman Catholic Church
that is in a position to exercise widespread social influence. At the parish
level, this church has direct access to the three-quarters of the population
who are practicing Catholics. The people look trustingly to the church for
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information not distorted by censorship, and for the best expression of Polish
public opinion. Sometimes the perspective in some parishes, in my opinion,
is too conservative and even reactionary. But fortunately, it also is
increasingly formed by the best of Catholic social thought as expressed in
John XXIII's Pacem in Terris and Vatican Council II's Gaudium et Spes. Pastoral
work in previous workers' strikes also has given some parishes direct influence
in recent events. The parishes in Gdansk, for instance, had served the families
of the workers killed and injured in the strike of 1970 so well that their
priests, of course, were looked to for pastoral counsel during the momentous
events of 1980.
The episcopate of the Roman Catholic Church, and especially its primate,
Cardinal Stephan Wyszynski, has great spiritual, moral and social influence.
The bishops have dealt with issues of social justice and human rights in Polish
society on the basis of theological principl� many times.

On

the tenth

anniversary of Pacem in Terris in 1973, they held an important symposium on
the realization of human rights as a necessary condition of both domestic and
international peace. Among others, the right of all persons to participate
in public life was stressed: "A person must not be a merely passive object
of the government, but must be the active element of the social life." They
took up no new theme, then, when the Main Council of the Episcopate met in
special session during the crisis on August 26, 1980.

Both the people and the

government knew the church was speaking with an authentic voice when the
episcopate called for: 1) an atmosphere of peace and internal order; 2) "honest
dialogue" between elected strike �ommittees and the government; and 3) an
acceptance of the right of workers to organize independent unions, based on
Section 68 of Gaudium et Spes where Vatican Council II had taught: "Among
the basic rights of the human persons must be counted the right of freely
I

founding labor unions

•

•

o(and) taking part freely in the activity of these

unions without risk of reprisal. " It was no

great surprise that these

teachings became almost a prescription for the reality that unfolded, and
that Cardinal Wyszynski's radio address to the nation stressing the workers'
right to independent unions, while at the same time calling for non-violent
negotiation, moderation in demands, and the need for new work discipline,
carried great influence. The pastoral letter from the bishops read in all
parishes on December 14, two days before the tenth anniversary of the day of
violence of the 1970 strike, also carried the same balance between support
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for change and responsible moderation.
At the highest level, one should also recognize the indirect influence
of Cardinal Karol Woyty�a's election in 1978 as Pope John Paul II. There
were, of course, the immediate religious results of increased participation
in the mass and increased priestly vocations. But there was also a heightened
national identity and pride, coupled with an increased readiness to exercise
the right to freedom of speech. The papal visit to Poland in 1979 united the
society in a way that had not been true for a long time. Even leading members
of the party participated in these celebrations. Moreover, the self-discipline
of the people in creating and ordering events involving hundreds of thousands
of persons, in the face of very limited government cooperation, convinced the
people of their capacity to organize on a large scale. In Warsaw, for instance,
there were 10,000 "public militia" made up of church laity who controlled the
vast crowds during the papal visit. Just as �here was no violence during the
papal visit of 1979, there was no violence during the massive strikes of 1980-
in happy contrast to the tragic violence marking the strikes of 1956 and 1970.
One of the fascinating statistics related to these events is the 30% decrease
in the use of alcohol in Poland during the two months of the strikes. To keep
the strikes well ordered, the strikers forbade themselves any alcohol. To
know the drinking habits of the average Polish worker is to know what a
strenuous exercise in self-discipline that was, and what a sign of new hope
and meaning in daily life. There is a new form of very deep national pride in
Poland expressed in stronger forms of self and social discipline; and the
teaching and communal life of the' church has contributed much to it.
The Orthodox and Protestant churches embrace so small a minority of the
present Polish population that their social influence can only be very small.
Approximately 3% of the people are in non-Roman Catholic churches, the most
important eight of which are covenanted together in the Polish Ecumenical
Council. Perhaps their most important contribution to the emergence of greater
democracy in Poland is their interpretation of its meaning in other nations,
both East and west. Their direct ties to the World Council of Churches and
the Christian Peace Conference provide important channels. For instance, after
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) closed its Polish border, a
representative of the Polish Ecumenical Council, invited to a regional meeting
of the Christian Peace Conference, became one of the few Polish citizens able to
cross that border and interpret the meaning of the continuing developments in
Poland to fellow P rotestants in this neighboring E ast-bloc country. Given the
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irrational fears sometimes ideologically created, such an interpretation is no
small service,
The last mode of church relation to these events to be noted is through
the three organizations which mediate between church and state in Poland--Pax,
Z nak, and the Christian Social Association. Znak is made up of autonomous clubs
of Catholic intellectuals, now grouped into "Old Znak" and "Parliamentary Znak. "
Some of the leaders of Old Znak, led by Mr. Mazowiecki, are major advisors
I

to the leadership of the new union. Mr. Reiff, the president of Pax, has
reiterated in Parliament since the strikes their proposal that Poland be
officially recognized as an ideologically pluralistic state. The chairman
of the Christian Social Association, Mr. Morawski, in a TV address on the eve
of All Saints Day, analyzed the breakdown

of trust in the Polish society and

urged the necessity of moral renewal in speaking the truth dialogically to each
other if Poland's severe problems were to be solved peacefully and justly. None
.
of these three organizations are direct expressions of the institutional church,
but all of them stand in relation to the church.
THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF DEMOCRACY IN POLAND
The significance of these events should neither be underestimated

nor

ideologically misunderstood by Americans. They are of enormous significance
for the democratization of socialist Poland. A government and a party accustomed
to

cormnand shall have to learn to negotiate. Government ministries and

industrial managers accustomed to little or no public control shall now be
submitted to public scrutiny. In short, a new level of actual democracy will
.

be achieved. But it will be a socialist democracy! There is nothing in the
constitution of the new union, and little in the realistic mood of the people,
which intends to change the socialist basis of their system. There is apprecia
tion for some of the accomplisl;nnents of this system--especially its opening
of educational and cultural opportunities under very difficult conditions after
World War II, allowing many poor workers and peasants fully to enter the society
for the first timeo To be sure, there is also criticism of its bureaucratic
heaviness, arbitrariness and inefficiency and a determination to improve it.
If nothing else, political realism and the memory of the failure of their alliances
with France and England in 1939 lead Poles to accept their present alliance
with the Soviet Union. Poland will remain Socialist Poland; but it may well
presage a level of democratic socialism unique to Eastern Europe and pregnant
with possibility for detente in the whole of Europe .
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It is, of course, the Connnunist Party of Poland that continues to hold
almost all the instruments of political power in its hands. But it must balance
its power against and with the social power of the church and the social and
economic power of the new union, on the one hand, and the pervasive military
and economic power of the Soviet Union, on the other. One of the current
jokes in Poland deals with the difficult job of Mr. Kania, the new First
Secretary of the Connnunist Party, who must simultaneously convince the Polish
people that they really now have independent unions, while convincing the leaders
of the Soviet Union that they do not.
Mr. Kania was the party secretary in the Gierek government who most
directly controlled the army and the police. It is said that while there were
other members of the Politburo who advocated the use of force against the
strikers, he always stood resolutely for a policy of settlement through
negotiationso His policy prevailed; but as the new leader

he faces a difficult

task of consolidating a yet deeply divided party. We all know that it is not
easy for those accustomed to connnand to learn to negotiate. There is still
much internal disagreement in the party as to what the new style, policies and
program should be. Perhaps the one element that could surely trigger a Soviet
invasion would be their conviction that the Polish party had become internally
too weak to be capable of governing. The question remains open as to whether
the emergence of the new, independent unions will lead to the democratization
of the ConnnunistParty in Poland. But the promise of such a possibility is there.
What is promise to some, however, constitutes a threat to others. The
German Democratic Republic has cldsed its Polish border, and Czechoslovakia
virtually has done so, to isolate their societies at least temporarily from so
dangerous a development.

(Although there probably also are economic reasons,

given the current shortage of consumer goods to Poland

And the annies of the

Soviet Union sit a few kilometers away, while its official press lays down a
propaganda barrage against the danger of independent unions. Yet it appears
that the leaders of the Soviet Union know that they must leave the solution
of this Polish crisis to Polish leaders. It should be remembered that unlike
East Gennany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet
troops have never been sent against Poland in either 1956 or 1970. Though
Soviet power, legitimate geo-political interests and irrational fears must be
reckoned with, the western press sometimes sensationalizes the dangers in a
way which is not calculated so much to benefit Poland as to sell newspapers.
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Poland has a remarkable history in the last 35 years of keeping a demo
cratic evolution of their socialist society on track while maintaining its basic
alliance with the superpower on its eastern border. The dynamic of this evolution
arises from the national patriotism of its C ommunist Party meeting the prudent
use of the social power of the church in the context of the basic Christian faith
of the Polish people. The evolution has not been easy

and has not been able to

proceed in a straight line. It has been much enhanced by the atmosphere of
detente since the Helsinki Agreement. Many have suffered, and perhaps many still
shall have to. But the promise of more domestic peace, based on greater justice,
achieved through more democratic participation is real in Poland just now. For
that all Christians and persons of good will everywhere should be grateful.

